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Mandatory livestock price reporting (MPR) was implemented in April 2001.  
Empirical evidence indicates a significant change in the weekly variability of publicly 
reported fed cattle grid premiums and discounts occurred after MPR implementation. 
We evaluate the effect of increased market transparency resulting from 
implementation of MPR on grid premium and discount dispersion levels. Empirical 
results suggest that increased transparency is compatible with either an increase or a 
decrease in dispersion.  These results suggest that during the pre-MPR period, the 
weekly premium and discount data were drawn from a non-representative sample. 
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The Agricultural News Marketing Service (AMS) has been providing weekly grid 
price reports for slaughter cattle since October 1996.  These reports provide the market 
with information on weekly premiums and discounts for quality grade, yield grade, and 
weight (Fausti et al. 1998).  
The Mandatory Livestock Price Reporting Act of 1999 (MPR) was implemented in 
April 2001. Prior to implementation of MPR, grid price reports were based on 
information collected from meat packing companies under a voluntary price reporting 
(VPR) system.  When the VPR system ended, only six packing firms were providing 
weekly reports.  Under MPR, all firms slaughtering over 125,000 animals annually were 
required to report price information for each plant they operate.  As a result, market 
transparency has increased due to: a) an increased number of firms reporting, and b) an 
increase in the quantity and quality of information reported by the packing firms.   
The general perspective on the relationship between transparency and price 
dispersion in the MPR literature is: As transparency increases, price dispersion 
decreases, which decreases price uncertainty for market participants (e.g. Azzam 2003). 
Azzam’s discussion of declining price dispersion is analogous to a decline in the variance 
of a random variable’s probability density function. This view is consistent with the 
discussion by Tomek (1980) on the inverse relationship between transaction price 
variance and the proportion of transactions reported. Tomek and Azzam defined the   2 
price dispersion as the variance associated with the probability density function of a 
random variable.   
 However, the AMS only reports mean and statistical range for grid premiums 
and discounts for different categories on weekly basis. Time-series data for the weekly 
range of reported grid premiums and discounts (figures 1-3) show that the range 
actually increased in post-MPR period for all categories depicted in these figures. Within 
the context of the earlier literature, this finding is a conundrum, given that the statistical 
range is a measure of dispersion. Nevertheless, we know that increased transparency is 
the result of MPR. Therefore, an important question is raised: Is increased transparency 
compatible with increased dispersion? 
Previous studies examining the time-series behavior of grid price series, pre- and 
post-MPR, also suggest that there is evidence of an increase in premium and discount 
variability in post-MPR period (Priebe 2004; Hogan and Ward 2005).  This empirical 
puzzle highlights the need for the additional investigation of the relationship between 
increased market transparency and price dispersion.  In this paper, we address the 
consequence of data collection regime reform (from VPR to MPR) on: a) market 
transparency and b) the level of dispersion associated with reported grid premiums and 
discounts.  
Literature Review of Cattle Marketing Issues 
Grid Pricing  
The development of a value based marketing system for fed cattle has been a 
priority issue for the beef industry since the publication of War on Fat by the Value   3 
Based Marketing Taskforce in 1990 (VBMTF, 1990).
1 Today the most successful form of 
value based marketing (VBM) for cattle is referred to as “grid pricing” (Fausti et al. 
1998).
2 The AMS began voluntary public reporting of national grid premium and 
discount prices in October 1996. 
The focus in the grid pricing literature has been on the incentive structure of grid 
pricing relative to average pricing of slaughter cattle and its potential success of 
supplanting the average pricing marketing channel (e.g. Johnson and Ward 2005; Fausti 
and Qasmi 2002; Feuz 1999; Fausti and Feuz 1995).  Feuz (1999) estimated that there 
were at least 25 different price grids being used by the packing industry shortly after the 
AMS began issuing public grid price reports.  This suggests that packer premium and 
discount schedules vary across firms.  Feuz (1999) also discussed the practice of large 
packing firms adjusting their grid premium and discount schedules based on plant 
averages.  The implication is that grid premiums and discounts not only vary across firms 
but can also vary across plants within a firm.  This implies the VPR system was not fully 
capturing this variation in premiums and discounts.  
Mandatory Livestock Price Reporting  
The impetus for imposing MPR in U.S. livestock markets was the belief by 
producer groups, economists, and government officials that VPR had become an 
ineffective public information mechanism for providing transparency in livestock 
markets.  Discussion in the fed cattle marketing literature suggests that increased 
industrial concentration in the packing and feedlot industries and increased use of 
captive supply procurement methods were the causes for the VPR system’s failure to   4 
provide accurate and timely market information to market participants (e.g. Anderson 
et al. 1998; Wachenheim and DeVuyst 2001).   
Recent empirical studies suggest that MPR has only marginally improved 
transparency in the fed cattle cash market (Grunewald et al. 2004; Fausti and Diersen 
2004; Pendell and Schroeder 2006, Fausti, Diersen, and Qasmi 2007a). Ward (2006), 
however, suggests that the level of transparency in the captive supply marketing 
channel has improved under MPR. Accordingly, these research findings suggest that the 
VPR system was not as inefficient as alluded to in the earlier literature, but the general 
consensus is that MPR has had a positive affect on the level of transparency in the 
slaughter cattle market. 
 Public Price Reporting and MPR 
Grid Price Reporting Mechanism under VPR 
Each week the AMS reports the mean and the statistical range for each grid 
premium and discount category. The premiums or discounts revealed by the surveyed 
packers to the AMS represented what individual packers were to pay for the coming 
week.  
Under the VPR system, on Monday morning the AMS contacted each packer on 
their survey list and collected information on the packer’s discount and premium 
schedule for the coming week.  The packers on voluntary bases provided this 
information and the AMS conducted no additional follow-ups.  Consequently, the 
weekly data observations reported to the AMS under VPR were relatively small and just 
prior to MPR implementation, only six packing firms were voluntarily reporting premium   5 
and discount schedules to the AMS on a weekly basis.  In MPR literature, there has been 
discussion about the data reported to the AMS under VPR system being prone to self-
selection bias (e.g. Fausti and Diersen 2004).  This issue appears to be germane subject 
to investigate with respect to the public reporting of grid premiums and discounts. 
However, the view that firm self selection bias tainted the statistical reliability of 
AMS public grid reports can not be substantiated.  We propose a more tractable 
alternative hypothesis: The AMS employed a non representative sampling selection 
procedure to provide weekly grid premium and discount reports, in the pre-MPR period. 
The use of a non representative sampling selection procedure can negatively affect the 
statistical accuracy of weekly reports.  We shall refer to this phenomenon as “sample-
selection bias.” 
Regime Change and Transparency 
  The passage of MPR regulations altered the institutional structure of public price 
reporting of grid premiums and discounts for slaughter cattle in two ways.  First, all 
firms slaughtering 125,000 cattle annually were mandated to report grid premiums and 
discounts for all grids on which they purchase cattle at each plant.  Therefore, the 
weekly data observations reported to the AMS under MPR are no longer merely a 
sample.  Instead these data are actually for the entire population.  Second, the AMS was 
given the right to audit the weekly reports submitted by firms.  This is expected to 
change the behavior of reporting firms.  Packer compliance to the MPR regulations 
imply increased diligence in the reporting of the data to the AMS and therefore 
increased quantity and quality of information reported under MPR. Obviously, this also   6 
removed any sample-selection bias, which may have been present during the pre-MPR 
period.  Accordingly, it is safe to conclude that these reforms have enhanced the ability 
of the public price reporting system to provide greater transparency in the post-MPR 
period.  
Empirical Hypothesis 
Implementation of MPR should result in an increase in the amount of transaction 
price information being reported by each firm as well as the number of firms reporting 
transactions to the AMS. According to Azzam (2003), an increased level of transactions 
reported after implementation of MPR should reduce dispersion associated with weekly 
reports because of the inverse relationship between information flow and transaction 
price variability. Therefore, weekly grid premium and discount reports released by the 
AMS should provide greater market transparency in the post-MPR period because the 
standard deviation of the mean of transaction prices reported to the AMS will decrease 
as the number of transactions increases, reducing price uncertainty. This view is 
consistent with the thinning market literature (Tomek, 1980, p 435).  
The MPR literature assumes that the sample drawn from the weekly population 
of transactions being reported to the AMS in pre-MPR period is small but 
representative, and thus the dispersion estimators for weekly grid premium and 
discount values are not affected by sample-selection bias.  To test this assumption we 
propose an alternative hypothesis: that the pre-MPR data collection process was based 
on firm level information being reported voluntarily by a small and non-representative 
sample of packers, injecting sample-section bias into public price reports.     7 
We assert that the implementation of MPR provides us an opportunity to test 
our alternative hypothesis. In the post-MPR period, data is based on plant level 
information provided by all firms slaughtering over 125,000 animals annually under the 
Mandatory Livestock Price Reporting Act of 1999. Therefore, we contend that the 
weekly grid premium and discount data for the post-MPR period engenders complete 
information and market transparency.  Accordingly, an appropriate empirical approach 
for testing the alternative hypothesis against the null hypothesis is to determine if there 
is the presence of unequal variances (or some proxies of variance) in pre-and post-MPR 
periods. Since the grid premium and discount data released by the AMS for the post-
MPR period data is based on the entire population reporting, it reflects complete 
market transparency.  Rejection of the null hypothesis of no change in the level of 
dispersion is tantamount to proving that grid premium and discount data released by 
the AMS for the pre-MPR period lacked market transparency.  We assert that if we do 
reject the null hypothesis and grid premium/ discount variability changed, then pre-MPR 
reports were marred by non-representative sample selection procedure, i.e., a sample-
selection bias.  
Empirical methodology 
  Let ti  denote a grid premium or discount reported by firm i (plant i after the 
implement of MPR) for weekt . the weekly mean t  and extreme values for each grid 
premium and discount categories, respectively, are defined as 
  (1)   
 
n
i ti t n
1
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  Suppose the MPR takes effect at the  1  j -th period. One measure of dispersion 
is the standard deviation. If ti  is available, the standard deviation before and after the 
implement of MPR can be calculated as 
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t  are available and ti  are unavailable. Therefore, 
the standard deviation cannot be used to measure dispersion given the data provided 
by AMS.  
  In order to assess the dispersion difference before and after the implementation 
of MPR, we instead find a proxy for dispersion. Define  t B as 
  (6)   
min max , max t t t t t B        ,  
  and the average of t B before and after MPR as 






















  Simple algebra shows that  
  (9) 
before before Sd B  , and   9 
  (10) 
after after Sd B  . 
  In other words, we can use the average of t B as an upper bound for the standard 
deviation. The dispersion before and after MPR is compared by the bound ratio of 




BR  . 
  The BRless than 1 indicates that the dispersion increases after MPR takes effect, 
and vice versa. One drawback of this approach is that the distribution of the BR ratio is 
unknown, so that no significance value can be attached to the ratio.  
  Then we try alternative methods that yield testing statistics having known 
distributions. One method is based on the F ratio defined as 
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t  . Standard statistical theory implies 
that the F ratio follows the F distribution under the null hypothesis of equal variances 
for each series (Hogg and Craig, 1995). A significant large F ratio provides evidence   10 
against equal variance. The adjusted F test of Shoemaker (2003) is also computed, which 
asymptotically follows the normal distribution with variance specified in Shoemaker 
(2003). This test generalizes the F test by assuming away the normality. Therefore, the 
adjusted F test is more robust than the F test.  
  The test of equal dispersion can also be conducted in a regression form 
(Wooldridge 2006). Defining the range t R and our proxy for coefficient of variation t C as 
  (17) 
min max
t t t R     , and 








A common approximation, found in most introductory statistics textbooks, for the 
standard deviation of a random variable is the statistical range divided by two.  Equation 
18 provides a rough approximation for the coefficient of variation associated with grid 
premium and discounts categories in the pre- and post-MPR periods.    
  Then the following regression is fitted by ordinary least squares method: 
  (19)  t t t D Z       1 0 , 
  Where t D is a dummy shift variable that equals zero before MPR and one after 
MPR. The dependent variable t Z can be the range t R , the coefficient of variation t C , or 
t B defined previously. The focus is on the t-ratio of the coefficient 1  . A significant t-
ratio indicates that t Z changes substantially after the implement of MPR.  
  These regression-based t tests are equivalent to the usual two-sample t test. 
Essentially, we are comparing the mean values of two samples separated by the date of   11 
MPR. The information in the sample data is the range, the coefficient variance and the 
bound. These variables can provide approximation for the original data.  
Data 
The AMS began issuing weekly grid premium and discount reports out of its Des 
Moines, Iowa, office in 1996.  The VPR data collection process in the Des Moines office 
consisted of weekly phone calls from the AMS reporter to packers on Monday morning.  
Packers provided their premium and discount schedules for the week.  No auditing or 
verification procedures were conducted to confirm the reliability of the data.
3  
After MPR, the St. Joe, MO, office of the AMS was given the responsibility of 
collecting packer grid premium and discount data.  The St. Joe office considers its 
premium and discount reports to be distinctly different from the reports issued under 
the old reporting regime.  Packers under MPR are required to submit a Cattle Premiums 
and Discount Weekly Report (form # LS-177) by 2 pm Monday of each week.  This report 
must be filed for each packing plant operated by the packers slaughtering over 125,000 
animals annually and purchasing cattle on a grid.  The St. Joe office tabulates the 
reported data and issues a public report each Monday.  The report contains essentially 
the same premium and discount categories and provides the weekly simple average and 
range for each category.  The St. Joe office is also responsible for the auditing of reports 
to ensure packer compliance.
4 The structure of the new reporting regime suggests that 
the packing industry will be more diligent in providing accurate weekly premium and 
discount reports to the St. Joe office.   12 
  Data on national slaughter cattle grid premium and discount for three quality 
categories (Prime, Select, and Standard) seven yield grade categories (Yg1.0-2.0, Yg2.0-
2.5, Yg2.5-3.0, Yg3.0-3.50, Yg3.5-4.0, Yg4.0-5.0, and Yg>5.0), and four weight categories 
(Wt400-500, Wt500-550, Wt950-1000, and Wt>1000) were collected from a weekly 
AMS publication (USDA-AMS: the National Carcass Premiums and Discounts for 
Slaughter Steers and Heifers weekly report). The pre-MPR period is from November 4, 
1996 through March 26, 2001. The post-MPR period runs from April 9, 2001 through 
September 26, 2005, when the MPR legislation expired due to a sunset clause.
5 With the 
exception of Wt950-1000, and Wt>1000, all grid category series consisted of 230 pre-
MPR observations, and 234 post-MPR observations. Grid series Wt950-1000 and 
Wt>1000 consisted of 229 pre-MPR observations and 334 post-MPR observations. Since 
yield grade categories, Yg2.5-3.0, Yg3.0-3.5, and Yg3.5-4.00 are more or less at par 
categories with no or very small premiums or discounts, these series were not analyzed. 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 contains the upper bounds for standard deviations for pre- and post-
MPR periods, and the bound ratio.  Bound ratios for all grid categories are less than 1, 
indicating that the average upper bound for standard deviations increased for all 
categories analyzed during the post-MPR period. Since the distribution of the bound 
ratios is unknown, no significance value can be attached to these ratios. 
Results for the F test and adjusted F two-tail test for equal variances are 
reported in Table 2, and 3, respectively. The adjusted F test is a generalized F test 
without any normality assumption and is more robust than the F test. The results of the   13 
F test are, however, reported for comparison purpose. With the adjusted F test, the null 
hypothesis regarding the equal variance for the average of the min, max, and mean of 
the weekly statistical range was rejected for each grid category. The post-MPR variance 
of the min, max, and mean of the statistical range was determined to be different from 
the pre-MPR variance at a 95 percent level. 
Results of two sample T tests based on the regression approach are reported in 
Table 4. The t-ratios of the shift variable in the regressions are significant for all three 
dispersion measure proxies (statistical range, coefficient of variation, and upper bound 
for the standard deviation), for all grid categories at 95 percent level. This regression 
based t test is equivalent to the usual two-sample t test, and a significant t ratio is 
analogous to rejecting the null hypothesis of equal dispersion measures.   
These results show that for each of the grid categories analyzed, the post-MPR 
dispersion proxies are significantly different from the pre-MPR levels. These results 
provide an over whelming evidence that the market information contained in the grid 
category premiums and discount data series for post-MPR period are significantly 
different from the information contained in the pre-MPR series.  Since we know that the 
post-MPR grid premiums series contain more accurate data for the whole population of 
meat packers buying animals on grids, we can safely conclude that the market 
transparency in the grid premiums and discounts during the pre-MPR era was lacking. In 
contrast to the assertions by Tomek (1980) and Azzam (2003), these results show that 
increased information flow and market transparency due to the implementation of the 
MPR is compatible with higher or lower market transaction price variability.   14 
Furthermore, all of the statistical tests applied to dispersion proxies measuring 
absolute dispersion levels suggest that dispersion increased. This suggests that in the 
pre-MPR period weekly grid premium and discount values publicly reported were based 
on a non-representative sample. The affect of the sample-selection bias in the pre-MPR 
period was to understate grid premium and discount dispersion levels relative to 
dispersion levels reflected in the population in the post-MPR period.  Thus the pre-MPR 
point estimators are based on a biased sampling procedure relative to the post-MPR 
period.    
With respect to the coefficient of variation regression results reported, they can 
be interpreted this way.  For discounts categories, the non representative sample 
selection procedure generated a sample-selection bias which increased relative 
variation (as measured by the coefficient of variation proxy) in the pre-MPR period as 
compared to the level of relative variation present in the population in the post-MPR 
period. For premium categories, sample-selection bias decreased relative variation in 
the pre-MPR period as compared to the level of relative variation present in the 
population in the post-MPR period.  The pre-MPR dichotomy between grid premium 
and discount categories with respect to relative variability in premium and discount 
structures may have contributed to the pre-MPR view expressed by producers that the 
grid marketing channel was a system of discounts only.  This issue is in need of further 
investigation.  
Is it possible that some other market influences are responsible for the statistical 
results we reported?  It can be an issue only if such influences coincided with the   15 
implementation of MPR and remained effective though out the post-MPR period 
analyzed. We are not aware of any such factors.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
reporting regime reform which eliminated sample-selection bias appears to be the 
compelling explanation for our empirical results.  
Summary 
The question we address in this paper is: was the reform of the public price 
reporting system for slaughter cattle sold on a grid necessary? The answer to this 
question based on empirical evidence is a categorical yes. Our results show that the 
post-MPR levels of premiums and discount dispersion levels (as measured by different 
proxies) for all grid categories are significantly different from the pre-MPR levels. 
Regime reform increased the level of price transparency in public grid price 
reports. All absolute measures of dispersion indicated an increase in dispersion in the 
post-MPR period.  This clearly means that the public grid price reports during the pre-
MPR period were less transparent as a result of sample-selection bias. Accordingly, we 
assert that the empirical evidence presented here supports the decision to reform the 
public livestock price reporting system for the fed cattle grid marketing.    
The expectations for a decreased level of price dispersion in the post-MPR, as 
asserted by Tomek (1980) and Azzam (2003), were based on assumption that the pre-
MPR grid premiums and discounts data were collected from a representative sample of 
packers.  In the absence of this condition, as was the case, increased market 
transparency resulting from MPR is compatible with either an increase or a decrease in 
dispersion.        16 
The implication of the study is that pre-MPR grid premium and discount data 
lacked statistical reliability.  This may have adversely affected price discovery in the grid 
market for fed cattle.  An important policy implication is that public price reporting 
mechanisms must adhere to standard statistical sampling methods to assure the 
statistical reliability of the information the reporting agency is disseminating to the 
public.     17 
Endnotes 
 
1.  In the late 1980s, The National Cattlemans Beef Association (NCBA) sanctioned the 
formation of the Valued Based Marketing Taskforce to study the competitive 
position of beef.  The taskforce issued a white paper in 1990 titled War on Fat.  
The taskforce identified average pricing of slaughter cattle in the cash market as a 
major barrier to the transmission of consumer preferences for leaner beef product 
with greater quality consistency back to the producer via the price mechanism. For 
an expanded discussion on the issue of value based marketing for slaughter cattle 
see Cross and Savell (1994) and Fausti et al. (1998).    
 
2.  Grid pricing typically accesses carcass premiums and discounts based on carcass 
quality grade, carcass yield grade, and hot carcass weight.  The concept of grid 
pricing evolved from the traditional grade and yield pricing system.  The AMS 
weekly public report provides prices for quality grade (prime, select, standard), 
yield grade(Yg1.0-2.0, Yg2.0-2.5, Yg2.5-3.0, Yg3.0-3.5, Yg3.5-4.0, Yg4.0-5.0, Yg>5), 
and weight discounts based on hot carcass weight (400-500, 500-550, 950-1000, 
over 1000 lbs).  See Fausti et al. (1998) for an expanded discussion.  
 
3.  The AMS data collection procedure was verified by the authors via a personal 
phone call made on July 15, 2005, to the Des Moines, Iowa, office. 
 
4.  It is the view of the AMS that packing plants are providing the actual premium and 
discount schedule they will be using for the week when the packers file their 
reports Monday morning.  
5.  See Fausti et al. 2007b for additional discussion on the expiration of MPR in 2005.   18 
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 of MPR 
After  
Implementation 
of MPR  
 
Bound Ratio,  
BR 
Prime    4.96  12.58  0.39 
Select    1.52    4.62  0.33 
Standard  10.14  12.66  0.80 
Yg1.0-2.0    2.35    5.08  0.46 
Yg2.0-2.5    1.15    2.82  0.41 
Yg4.0-5.0    6.34    7.92  0.80 
Yg>5.0    6.27    8.31  0.75 
Wt400-500    9.62  18.25  0.53 
Wt500-550    8.06  15.46  0.52 
Wt950-1000    7.79  10.55  0.74 
Wt>1000    9.68  12.96  0.75 
 
 





t    
 
max
t    
 
t    
Prime  3.69*  9.30*  9.77* 
Select  2.30*  1.19  1.66* 
Standard  0.65  0.94  1.86* 
Yg1.0-2.0   na  0.05  1.32* 
Yg2.0-2.5   na  6.22*  5.73* 
Yg4.0-5.0  0.02  4.58*  0.28 
Yg>5.0  0.08  2.31*  0.18 
Wt400-500  0.00  1.79*  2.96* 
Wt500-550  1.11  4.24*  1.73* 
Wt950-1000  1.42*  0.18  0.82 
Wt>1000  0.66  1.66*  0.46 
Note: All table values are test statistics, and * indicates the significance at 95% level. 
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t    
 
max
t    
 
t    
Prime   1.31*   2.23*   2.28* 
Select   0.83*   0.18   0.51* 
Standard  -0.42*  -0.06   0.62* 
Yg1.0-2.0    na  -2.91*   0.28* 
Yg2.0-2.5    na   1.83*   1.75* 
Yg4.0-5.0  -3.75*   1.52*  -1.26* 
Yg>5.0  -2.52*   0.84*  -1.71* 
Wt400-500    na   0.58*   1.09* 
Wt500-550   0.10   1.45*   0.55* 
Wt950-1000   0.35*  -1.74*  -0.20* 
Wt>1000  -0.42*   0.51*  -0.77* 




Table 4: Two-Sample T Test  
 
Grid Category 
Average Range,  
t R  
Coefficient of 
Variance, t C   
Bound,  
t B  
Prime  24.85*    11.94*  21.29* 
Select  19.93*  -13.53*  19.34* 
Standard  9.75*    -7.90*  11.23* 
Yg1.0-2.0  38.13*   21.62*  38.14* 
Yg2.0-2.5  32.23*   10.60*  31.22* 
Yg4.0-5.0  13.69*  -16.03*  10.04* 
Yg>5.0  20.71*  -23.76*  13.80* 
Wt400-500  88.79*  -59.92*  68.85* 
Wt500-550  65.93*  -68.41*  50.78* 
Wt950-1000  14.45*  -43.66*  15.94* 
Wt>1000  21.96*  -28.38*  20.52* 
Note: All table values are test statistics, and *indicates the significance at 95% level. 
 
 
   22 
  Fig 1. Changes in premiums and discounts for grades 
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  Fig 2. Changes in premiums and discounts for yield categories 
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  Fig 3. Changes in discount for weight categories 
 



















MPR starts Apr 2001
 
 



















MPR starts Apr 2001
 
 



















MPR starts Apr 2001
 
 



















MPR starts Apr 2001
 